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ARE THERE CHECKS AND BALANCES ON
TERMINATING THE LIVES OF CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES? SHOULD THERE BE?
Thomas J. Balch*
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and
an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in
court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights
include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him,
to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.'
INTRODUCTION
Although the Child Abuse Amendments of 19842 set an objective
standard of treatment for disabled infants with life-threatening
conditions, by September 1989 a report of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights concluded the following:
Surveys of health care personnel, the results of investigative
reporting, the testimony of people with disabilities and their
relatives, and the repeatedly declared views of physicians set
forth in their professional journals all combine to persuade the
Commission of the likelihood of widespread and continuing
denials of lifesaving treatment to children with disabilities....
[E]vidence strongly suggests that the situation has not
dramatically changed since the implementation of the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984 on October 1, 1985 .... [C]lose
working relationships among State child protective services
agencies and members of the medical profession have resulted in
* Director, Robert Powell Center for Medical Ethics of the National Right to Life Committee; J.D.,
New York University School of Law, 1983.
1. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
2. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i (2006) and implemented in relevant part by 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008)).
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the substantial failure of many such agencies to enforce
effectively the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.
3
There is little basis to believe that the last two decades have seen
more, rather than less, widespread implementation of the standards in
the 1984 law. In a 2005 article, physician and attorney Sadath Sayeed
bluntly asserted "the striking incongruity between federally derived
legal doctrine and normative medical practice" and concluded that "it
should come as no surprise that professional adherence to federal
policy remains a fiction in the United States. .... 4 On the contrary, it
is apparent that instead resort has generally been had to the approach
advocated by many ethicists and physicians: the use of ethics
committees to consider initially controversial or questionable cases in
which withholding or withdrawal of life-preserving medical
treatment, food, or fluids from children with disabilities is
contemplated.
While other articles in this symposium debate the standards
incorporated in the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, this article
challenges this widely-promoted-and practiced-alternative. It raises
the question whether the use of the ethics committee procedure, in
theory and in practice, comports with fundamental norms of due
process as they have been recognized in American jurisprudence.
I. THE PREVALENCE OF ETHIcs COMMITTEES
Hospital ethics committees have emerged as a common forum for
resolving ethical disputes associated with life and death health care
decisions. 5 The rise of the ethics committee to serve in this powerful
3. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES 148-49 (1989). As a matter of full disclosure, the author served as an attorney-adviser for
the commission, participating in the drafting of the report.
4. Sadath A. Sayeed, Baby Doe Redux? The Department of Health and Human Services and the
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002: A Cautionary Note on Normative Neonatal Practice, 116
PEDIATRICS e576, e584 (2005).
5. "Although less than one percent of hospitals in the United States had an ethics committee in
1983, today eighty-four percent of large American hospitals have established such committees." Robin
[VoL 25:4
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CHECKS AND BALANCES ON TERMINATING LIVES
capacity may be traced to an initial endorsement by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the highly popularized Karen Ann Quinlan case6
more than three decades ago.7 Since then, the use of hospital ethics
committees has been bolstered by the support of a host of influential
medical associations 8 and regulatory entities. 9 A federal regulatory
scheme endorses them in cases involving health care decisions for
infants.' 0 Two states have mandated the use of ethics committees
within hospitals," numerous other states have implicitly endorsed the
practice of ethics committees by statutorily authorizing their
involvement in particular health care decisions, 12 and others have
Fretwell Wilson, Hospital Ethics Committees As the Forum of Last Resort: An Idea Whose Time Has
Not Come, 76 N.C. L. REV. 353, 356-57 (1997-1998).
6. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668-69 (N.J. 1976).
7. See Randall B. Bateman, Attorneys on Bioethics Committees: Unwelcome Menace or Valuable
Asset?, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 247, 249-250 (1995); Diane E. Hoffman, Regulating Ethics Committees in
Health Care Institutions-Is It Time?, 50 MD. L. REV. 746, 754 (1991); Bethany Spielman, Has Faith in
Health Care Ethics Consultants Gone Too Far? Risks of an Unregulated Practice and a Model Act to
Contain Them, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 161, 161 (2001) (all commenting that the emergence of hospital
ethics committees was spurred initially by Quinlan).
8. See Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of
Caring, 50 MD. L. REV. 798, 799 n.10 (1991) (citing Judicial Council, American Medical Association,
Guidelines for Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions, 253 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2698 (1985),
AMERICAN NURSES' ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, GUIDELINES FOR NURSES' PARTICIPATION
AND LEADERSHIP IN INSTITUTIONAL ETHICAL REVIEW PROCESSES (American Nurses Association
1985), AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES: HOSPITAL COMMITTEES ON BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (1984)).
9. See Gail J. Povar, Evaluating Ethics Committees: What do we Mean by Success?, 50 MD. L. REV.
904, 905-05 (1991) (citing THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT (1983); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1982);
GUIDELINES RELATING TO HEALTH CARE FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS, 45 C.F.R. § 84 APP. C (2005)
[Povar cites 1984 edition of GUIDELINES]). See also JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 66 (1995).
10. See HHS MODEL GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS TO ESTABLISH INFANT CARE
REVIEW COMMITTEES, originally published at 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (Apr. 15, 1985), as authorized by
amendments to the federal CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACT, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5117
(1988).
I1. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 19-370 to 71 (LexisNexis 2008) (uses term "patient care
advisory committee"); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-5.1(h) (2009) ("multidisciplinary bioethics
committee, and/or prognosis committee(s), or equivalent(s)").
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231B (LexisNexis 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(6.5) (2008);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507(8) (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (1)(h)(LexisNexis 2008);
O.C.G.A. § 31-39-4(e)(2) (2008); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 38A (LexisNexis 2008); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-63-3 (2008); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT. § 1750-b(5)(d) (Consol. 2009); TEx. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-5(d) (2008).
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accorded immunity from liability to members of ethics committees. 13
No longer serving in merely an advisory capacity, the hospital
ethics committee has increasingly become the final decision maker
for families in crisis about life or death decisions. 14 With little or no
judicial oversight, the hospital ethics committee has evolved into a
quasi-legal entity, wielding enormous power. States have begun to
immunize ethics committees and their members from liability
through privilege and immunity statutes. 15 At least one scholar has
concluded that these statutes "maximize the authority of ethics
committees while minimizing their accountability.'
16
Though it has been argued that the ethics committee's primary
focus should be to "serve and protect the patient,"' 7 concerns have
been expressed that they are more likely to serve as a "shield" for
health care providers, reducing the risk of liability for actions that
have been approved by them.' 8 while leaving the patient vulnerable.
Susan Wolf argues:
Ethics committees are a due process wasteland. There is no
indication that committees regularly offer patients any of the
basic procedural protections such as notice, an opportunity to be
heard, a chance to confront those in opposition, receipt of a
written determination and a statement of reasons, and an
opportunity to challenge that determination.... [T]he committee
wields great influence over the treatment decision but accords no
protections for the patient's rights. 9
13. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.7 (LexisNexis 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4909(a) (2007);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-374(c) (LexisNexis 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-201 (2007);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 248(h) (2008).
14. Wolf, supra note 8, at 808-09.
15. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-374(c) (LexisNexis 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-
201(1) (2007).
16. Wilson, supra note 5, at 405.
17. Wolf, supra note 8, at 805.
18. "[S]uch an entity could lend itself well to an assumption of a legal status which would allow
courses of action not now undertaken because of the concern for liability." Karen Teel, The Physician's
Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 9 (1975).
19. Wolf, supra note 8, at 831.
[Vol. 25:4
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The pervasive support for and widespread implementation of the
hospital ethics committee, combined with the fact that such
committees are empowered to resolve cases involving
constitutionally protected rights,20 warrants more careful scrutiny as
well as due process protections. As Spielman aptly stated, "[t]he only
limits on ethics consultants' behavior are their own consciences and,
to a limited extent, the law."
21
II. THE STANDARD FOR DuE PROCESS AND THE COMPETING
INTERESTS
When decisions regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-
saving medical treatment from children with disabilities are made
through an ethics committee process at a private-rather than a
government-health care facility, the state action that is required to
make the constitutional due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment applicable is not present. Nevertheless, because those
requirements embody tenets of fundamental fairness central to the
American legal heritage, they can provide a template to help measure,
as a matter of public policy, the propriety and fairness of ethics
committee procedures in private institutions.
The Fourteenth Amendment states, "nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
....,,22 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep 't of Health, the Supreme
Court noted that "[i]t cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause
protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment."
23
20. Id. at 802.
21. Spielman, supra note 7, at 182.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990). See also id. at 283 n.10. Any
putative "substantive due process" interest in life-saving medical treatment, food, or fluids is beyond the
scope of this article; the claim here is simply that the interest in not being deprived of these is sufficient
to trigger procedural due process requirements. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (quoting
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978)) ( "Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons
not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.").
20091
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"To determine what process is constitutionally due," the Supreme
Court has "generally balanced three distinct factors" 24 identified in
the seminal case of Mathews v. Eldridge: "First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest.,
25
It will be most useful to begin by assessing the competing interests
before balancing them in application to the particular procedures used
and in comparison to specific procedural safeguards that might be
used but are lacking in the typical ethics committee process.
A. The Interest of the Child with a Disability in Life
Here, the first Eldridge factor, the "private interest that will be
affected," is the child with a disability's interest in his or her life-and
therefore against involuntary termination of the food, fluids, or
treatment necessary to preserve it.
This is a weighty interest. It has been most specifically considered
by the Court in Cruzan. That decision upheld Missouri's decision to
require, before an incompetent patient could be deprived of nutrition
and hydration, clear and convincing evidence that this was her
choice. The Cruzan Court concluded that "[w]e think it self-evident
that the interests at stake [including the 'interest in life'] are more
substantial, both on an individual and societal level, than those
involved in a run-of-the-mill civil dispute."
26
It is true that Cruzan involved a reverse of the situation treated in
this article, since in that case the government asserted an interest in
protecting life while the private party, as surrogate for Nancy Cruzan,
asserted an interest in rejecting food and fluids. The Cruzan opinion
is nevertheless relevant here, since the Court, in assessing the weight
24. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924,931 (1997). See also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,224-25
(2005).
25. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
26. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added).
[VoL 25:4
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CHECKS AND BALANCES ON TERMINATING LIVES
of the government's interest in imposing the clear and convincing
evidence standard, relied heavily on cases in which that standard has
been deemed constitutionally required to protect individuals against
the government.27 The Court observed:
We recognize that these cases involved instances where the
government sought to take action against an individual. Here, by
contrast, the government seeks to protect the interests of an
individual, as well as its own institutional interests, in life. We do
not see any reason why important individual interests should be
afforded less protection simply because the government finds
itself in the position of defending them. . . .That it is the
government that has picked up the shield should be of no
moment.
28
Capital punishment cases have emphasized the importance of
particularly careful due process when a human life is at stake. In
Ford v. Wainwright, the Court held that when execution is contingent
upon the establishment of a fact, "that fact must be determined with
the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life or
death of a human being."29 In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court
wrote:
27. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282-83. The Court wrote:
This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing
evidence'-when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both
'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money.' Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424
(1979)). Thus, such a standard has been required in deportation proceedings (Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966)); in denaturalization proceedings (Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 122-23 (1943)); in civil commitment proceedings (Addington, 441
U.S. at 424); and in proceedings for the termination of parental rights (Santosky, 455
U.S. at 756). Further, this level of proof, 'or an even higher one, has traditionally been
imposed in cases involving allegations of civil fraud, and in a variety of other kinds of
civil cases involving such issues as ... lost wills, oral contracts to make bequests, and the
like.' Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285, n.18.
28. Id. at 282 n.10 (citation omitted).
29. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).
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[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence
of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs
more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs
from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.30
Similarly, in Zant v. Stephens, the Court said that "although not every
imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital
case, to set aside a state-court judgment, the severity of the sentence
mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of
error."
31
B. Interests to Be Balanced Against the Interest in Life of the Child
with a Disability
On the other side are the interests that may be asserted against
requiring a more rigorous due process procedure. These include
protecting the "genuine" welfare of the child with a disability who, it
may be contended, would be better off dead; promoting the "quality
of life"; protecting the conscience rights of health care providers who
consider it ethically wrong to participate in preserving the lives of
those they consider to have a poor quality of life; and controlling
costs, both those directly associated with any due process
proceedings and any cost of providing treatment while those
proceedings are prolonged. The government might also assert an
interest in rationing health care; to the extent that the child with a
disability uses health care resources while the due process review is
continuing, those resources may not be available for other patients
whose lives the government may feel should have higher priority
30. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
31. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). See also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149
(1994) ("There is a heightened need for fairness in the administration of death.").
[Vol. 25:4
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CHECKS AND BALANCES ON TERMINATING LIVES
because of an assumed higher quality of life, better chances for
recovery, or other factors. Let us consider each in turn.
1. The State Interest in Protecting the "Genuine" Interests of the
Child with a Disability in Dying
Some argue that in some cases of disability it is in the child's best
interests to die.32 While this interest may perhaps be put forward as a
justification for ultimately deciding to withhold or withdraw
lifesaving medical treatment, food, or fluids, its use as a basis for less
rather than more procedural protections seems dubious. The Cruzan
Court noted:
An erroneous decision not to terminate [life-preserving
measures] results in a maintenance of the status quo; the
possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in
32. Conflicts over treatment that may be provided or denied to a child with a disability obviously
involve patients who are not currently competent to make health care decisions for themselves. Most
states authorize surrogate decision-making by relatives or others on behalf of an incompetent patient
who has not appointed a health care agent. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE:
THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING (3d ed. 2009) 8-24 to 8-25 (Table 8-1). These state statutes
are collected in MICHAEL JORDAN, DURABLE POWERS OF ATTORNEY AND HEALTH CARE DIRECTIVES
(4th ed. 2007). In the case of a minor, normally the surrogate decision makers will be the child's parents.
It can of course be contended in individual cases that the decisions of a surrogate do not
accurately reflect the best interests of the patient. The widely publicized and hotly contested Schiavo
case involved such a dispute (different family members took opposing positions about Terri Schindler
Schiavo's wishes concerning the provision of nutrition and hydration and about whether the surrogate's
decisions about the level of rehabilitative treatment to be provided her were appropriate). See generally
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (includes discussion of
prior state court action in the matter), affid, 403 F. 3d 1223 (11 th Cir. 2005).
Judicial proceedings in which the health care decision of a surrogate can be challenged as not
properly representing an incompetent patient are widely authorized by state law and are an obvious
forum in which to raise and resolve such issues. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.140 (2008); ARiZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-3206 (LexisNexis 2008); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4765-4771 (Deering 2008); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16 § 2511 (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.105 (LexisNexis 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 327E-14 (LexisNexis 2008); IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-36-1-8 (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A § 5-814 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 17 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMp. LAWS
§ 333.1059 (2008); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-229 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-3421
(LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:7 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-14 (LexisNexis
2008); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH. LAW § 2992 (Consol. 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08(E)(1)
(LEXISNEXIS 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.550 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-503, 504 (2007); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-11-1815 (2008); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.165 (VERNON 2007); Wis.
STAT. § 155.60 (4)(a) (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-415 (2008).
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medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the
patient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unexpected
death of the patient despite the administration of life-sustaining
treatment at least create[s] the potential that a wrong decision
will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An
erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment,
however, is not susceptible of correction.
33
2. The State 's Interest in Promoting "Quality of Life"
In Cruzan, the Court said that "a State may properly decline to
make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual
may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally
protected interests of the individual., 34 Obviously, however, a state
can also make the opposite choice: to promote the preservation only
of lives judged to have adequate quality, as the courts of some states
have done. Washington's Supreme Court, for example, maintains that
"[t]he most significant state interest, the preservation of life, . . .
weakens . . . in situations where continued treatment serves only to
prolong a life inflicted with an incurable condition."
35
The distinction between a putative state interest in advancing the
quality of life (by eliminating those whose lives are deemed to lack
adequate quality) and that in promoting the "genuine" interests of the
child with a disability in dying is that the government might claim
that even if it is conceded to be in the patient's genuine interest to
live, from a societal standpoint that outcome is undesirable. However,
as with a state interest in promoting the "genuine" interests of the
child with a disability, the potential governmental interest in
promoting quality of life is more relevant to the substantive issue of
whether patients can be denied life-preserving care against their will
33. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,283 (1990).
34. Id. at 282.
35. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983). Accord Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683
(Aiz. 1987); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 626 (Nev. 1990) ("The State's interest in the
preservation of life relates to meaningful life.").
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CHECKS AND BALANCES ON TERMINATING LIVES
than to limits on the procedure that may be necessary reliably to
determine what their actual quality of life may be. No matter how
weighty this governmental interest may be said to be, it does not
weigh in the balance against whatever genuine individual interest
there may be in more effective procedural due process.
3. The State Interest in Promoting Freedom of Conscience
Physicians, health care institutions, and other health care providers
may maintain that it violates their conscience to require them to
provide treatment that maintains the lives of children with disabilities
in cases in which they believe the burdens of such a life outweigh its
benefits. The Supreme Court has recognized a governmental interest
in promoting freedom of conscience, albeit in a different context.
Locke v. Davey upheld a state program generally providing
scholarship funds but excluding those attending programs in
devotional theology in significant part based on the state's interest in
protecting the freedom of conscience of its citizens from being forced
through taxes to support religions with which they might disagree.36
It might similarly be argued that "health care professionals ought not
and, in fact, cannot be coerced to treat when such treatment affronts
their sense of ethics, ' ' 37 and that the state has an interest in protecting
them from being so compelled.
It may be questioned, however, whether deference to a
governmental interest in protecting conscience rights can be absolute.
In a different context, R. Alta Charo argues:
[L]icensing systems complicate the equation: such a claim [in
defense of non-treatment on the basis of freedom of conscience]
would be easier to make if the states did not give these
36. 540 U.S. 712, 722 (2004). But see id at n.5 ("Justice Scalia notes that the State's 'philosophical
preference' to protect individual conscience is potentially without limit .... [H]owever, the only interest
at issue here is the State's interest in not funding the religious training of clergy. Nothing in our opinion
suggests that the State may justify any interest that its 'philosophical preference' commands.").
37. Erich Loewy & Richard Carlson, Futility and Its Wider Implications, 153 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 429, 429 (1993).
2009]
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professionals the exclusive right to offer such services. By
granting a monopoly, they turn the profession into a kind of
public utility, obligated to provide service to all who seek it.
Claiming an unfettered right to personal autonomy while holding
monopolistic control over a public good constitutes an abuse of
the public trust .... 38
Were certain licensed health care providers to assert that their
conscience precludes them from providing health care to members of
a particular race, it seems doubtful that otherwise unconstitutional
state action facilitating such treatment denials would be saved by an
assertion of the governmental interest in protecting the consciences of
health care providers.
Here, the issue may be a limited one-not necessarily one of a
permanent infringement on the conscience of unwilling health care
providers, but one of for how long it is temporarily infringed. The
issue is whether the addition of due process safeguards would delay
the ultimate determination. More extensive procedures may, by
taking a longer time, increase the period during which health care
providers must unwillingly provide treatment to which they object.
The question is what weight to give any interest the state may assert
in protecting those consciences, to the extent that it may further be
infringed through additional delay that may be required by more
rigorous due process.
4. The State Interest in Reducing Costs
It has been argued that "[t]he prolongation of human life, that is
devoid of quality, creates significant financial . . . burdens for
patients, families, medical care providers, and society." 39 Providing
more stringent due process can increase costs in two ways. First, the
38. R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience-Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2471, 2473 (2005).
39. Constance M. Holden, Easing the Burden of Decisionmaking in Futile Situations, 7 HEC FORUM
322, 322 (1995).
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procedures themselves can be costly. To the extent there are more
extensive hearings and the opportunity is given for discovery,
additional medical examinations and opinions, or the involvement of
counsel, there are obviously increased costs. 4° Second, to the extent
that more rigorous due process delays denial of treatment, the costs of
that treatment, and all the associated costs of maintaining the life of
the patient, will continue to mount. There can be no question,
therefore, that the government has a legitimate interest in limiting
costs to be taken into account in the balancing process envisioned by
Mathews v. Eldridge.
It is significant, however, that in another context in which a life is
at stake, the imposition of capital punishment, quite substantial costs
are tolerated in the effort to ensure that an innocent individual is not
executed. The cost of ensuring procedural due process in a capital
punishment case has been calculated at more than two million
dollars.41
Examination of four potential governmental interests, therefore,
leads to the conclusion that two of them-those in protecting the
consciences of health care providers and in reducing costs-are
relevant in the balance against the individual interest in preserving
one's life under the Mathews v. Eldridge test to determine what
procedural due process would be constitutionally required (were state
action present) when health care facility ethics committees deny life-
preserving medical treatment, food, or fluids to children with
disabilities.
40. Cf Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228 (2005) (in balancing interests in order to evaluate
what process is due a prisoner before being sent to a "Supermax" facility, "[t]he problem of scarce
resources is [a] component of the State's interest").
41. Information Plus, A General History of Capital Punishment in America, in PUNISHMENT AND
THE DEATH PENALTY 109 (Robert Baird & Stuart Rosenbaum eds., 1995) (cost of appealing capital
murder conviction in Texas estimated at $2,316,655); PHILIP COOK ET AL., DUKE UNIVERSITY TERRY
SANFORD INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC POLICY, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH
CAROLINA 78 (1993) (estimating $2.16 million per execution over the costs of a non-death penalty
murder case with a sentence of imprisonment for life.).
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III. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF DUE PROCESS
In the context of the detention of American citizens held as enemy
combatants, the Supreme Court has reiterated the fundamentals of
procedural due process:
We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut
the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An essential principle of due process is
that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case"' (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950))); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc.
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617
(1993) ("[D]ue process requires a 'neutral and detached judge in
the first instance."' (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,
61-62 (1972))). "For more than a century the central meaning of
procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are
to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified. It is equally
fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard 'must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."' Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (citations
omitted)). These essential constitutional promises may not be
eroded.
42
42. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion). Although the quotation is
from a plurality of four Justices, the basic assertions contained in it commanded a majority of the Court.
See id. at 553 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment) ("It is not that I could disagree with the plurality's determinations ... that someone in
[Vol. 25:4
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When children with disabilities are at risk of denial of treatment
necessary to sustain their lives, does the procedure through which the
determination is made meet these requirements?
A. Is an Unspecific "Best Interests" Standard Unconstitutionally
Vague?
In order to "receive notice of the factual basis for [one's]
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the . . . factual
assertions," it is necessary for there to be an articulated standard for
what facts are relevant and dispositive.
When specific standards such as those in the Child Abuse
Amendments of 198443 are rejected, in its place the ethics committee
is said to be guided by something like the "best interests" of the child
with a disability, which has been described as incorporating "what a
reasonable person would want or how a reasonable person would
balance burdens and benefits . . . ."4 A striking difference is the
Hamdi's position is entitled at a minimum to notice of the Government's claimed factual basis for
holding him, and to a fair chance to rebut it before a neutral decision maker; nor, of course, could I
disagree with the plurality's affirmation of Hamdi's right to counsel." (citations omitted)).
43. The statute seeks to prevent "withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants
with life-threatening conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B) (2006). It offers the following definition
of "withholding of medically indicated treatment":
'Withholding of medically indicated treatment' is defined as the failure to respond to the
infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating physician's or physicians'
reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all such conditions, except that the term does not include the failure to provide
treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when,
in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment-(A) the infant is
chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would-(i)
merely prolong dying; (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's
life-threatening conditions; or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the
infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the
survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane.
Id. § 5106g(6). Detailed explication of the standard is provided in federal regulations and
appended guidelines. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008).
44. Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of
All Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 187, 189 (2007); see also Loretta M. Kopelman, Rejecting the Baby
Doe Regulations and Defending a "Negative" Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 30 J. MED. &
PHIL. 331 (2005); Loretta M. Kopelman, Are the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe Rules Misunderstood or
Mistaken?, 115 PEDIATRICS 797 (2004).
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comparative vagueness 45 of the basis under which treatment may be
denied. How does this affect children with disabilities and their
representatives?
One of the principal constitutional objections to vague standards is
inapplicable in this context-that of the need to "give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.' '46 It is not to be expected
that children have control over their disabilities so as to be able to
avoid them if they are on notice that they must do so in order to
forestall their being denied life-saving health care. However, two
other important problems with vague standards are directly relevant
in judging whether a "best interests" standard would comport with
constitutionally-mandated due process.
Vague statutes fail to "provide explicit standards for those who
apply them.' 47 This is a serious flaw, because "[a] vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.' 48
Under the "best interests" standard, whether a patient will be denied
life-saving treatment in a particular hospital depends on whatever the
consensus or majority on that hospital's ethics committee considers
"inappropriate."
One ethics committee might deem it inappropriate to provide life-
saving treatment to a child whose disability is expected to mean
permanent incontinence, mental retardation, and the need to use a
wheelchair. Across town, a different hospital's ethics committee
45. Although vagueness doctrine is most commonly used to assess criminal laws, it has also been
applied to statutes that are not enforced by a criminal penalty. E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 374
(1964) (holding unconstitutionally vague loyalty oath required as a condition of state government
employment); Minnesota ex reL. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940) (concluding that a
civil commitment statute is not "too vague and indefinite to constitute valid legislation").
46. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). If health care providers indeed faced
any significant adverse consequences if they failed to abide by the standard of care-if, for example,
denial of treatment that was held to violate the standard could lead in practice to disciplinary procedures
or civil or criminal liability-then the vagueness of the Best Interests Standard could be a barrier to its
constitutional enforcement and this objection could become relevant.
47. Id., quoted in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 170 n.64 (2003).
48. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
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might authorize treatment for such a child, but deny it to a
"minimally conscious" child who could live indefinitely but whose
mental condition is not expected to improve. Still a third ethics
committee might be less concerned with the patient's mental status
than with whether she or he has a terminal condition. The inherent
subjectivity of "quality of life" assessments and the wide variety of
possible lines that could be drawn49 suggest that, in the absence of
more specific standards, the differences in how similarly-situated
people might be treated, not only from facility to facility, but even
within the same facility depending on the shifting composition of the
facility's ethics committee from year to year, could be wide indeed.
As with an unconstitutionally vague Cincinnati ordinance that
prohibited gatherings of three or more persons conducted in a manner
that "annoys" a police officer or other passerby, the "best interests"
treatment standard is vague because it does not offer "an imprecise
but comprehensible normative standard, but rather... no standard of
conduct is specified at all."50 As the Court said in striking down as
vague a Massachusetts law against "contemptuously" treating the
U.S. flag:
Such a provision simply has no core. This absence of any
ascertainable standard for inclusion and exclusion is precisely
what offends the Due Process Clause. The deficiency is
particularly objectionable in view of the unfettered latitude
thereby accorded law enforcement officials and triers of fact...
under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury were
free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for
treatment of the flag.
5
'
49. Mary A. Crossley, Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns: An Analysis, 6 MED. & L.
499, 509-10 (1987) (identifying four distinct levels or varieties of quality of life standard that have been
advocated in the professional literature).
50. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
51. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974) (emphasis added).
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The second problem with a standard as vague as that of "best
interests" is that it makes the giving of adequate notice of the subject
matter of the hearing essentially impossible. A vague criminal statute
"fails... to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which
they are charged,, 52 and "real notice of the true nature of the charge
... [is] the first and most universally recognized requirement of due
process. ' 53 As the Court held in a non-criminal case involving an
engineer's denial of a security clearance, "where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action
depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has
an opportunity to show that it is untrue." 54 The "best interests"
standard fails to advise the representatives of children with
disabilities of the nature of what they must rebut in order to prevent
the denial of treatment necessary to sustain the children's lives.
Notice in advance of a hearing is meaningful only to the extent that it
allows the person notified an opportunity to prepare for the rebuttal
or other presentation at the hearing. A standard so lacking in content
as whether treatment is in the child's "best interests" leaves the
child's representative at a loss in formulating a convincing
presentation, effectively denying "a fair opportunity to rebut.,
55
How should the vagueness of the "best interests" standard be
evaluated under the Mathews v. Eldridge factors? 56 The "risk of an
erroneous deprivation ...through the procedures used" when the
child's representatives have no advance notice of the specific
standard to be applied is surely high, while "the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards" 57 in the form
of a clearly-spelled-out standard is also high, because it would then
be more likely that the child's representatives could effectively
prepare for the hearing before the ethics committee. The child's
52. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948).
53. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941).
54. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,496 (1959).
55. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion).
56. See supra text accompanying note 25.
57. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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interest in life, as we have already seen, is weighty. Of the
government's interests, it is hard to see how either an interest in
promoting the quality of life or in protecting the "genuine" interests
of the child in death would be compromised by clearly setting out a
specific standard intended to elaborate and define those interests. Nor
would the existence of a more specific standard, in and of itself,
increase the costs the government may wish to limit.
That leaves the governmental interest in promoting freedom of
conscience for health care providers. This interest could indeed be
affected by adoption of a specific standard. An indefinite standard
that refers only to "best interests" affords the greatest conceivable
range to the individual or collective conscience of health care
providers. Anything that the ethics committee in any case finds to be
inappropriate need not be provided beyond, presumably, the date of
the ethics committee meeting. On the other hand, the articulation of a
standard precise enough to give adequate notice would appear to
protect only the consciences of those health care providers who agree
with whatever the particular standard may be.
Upon further analysis, however, the impact of requiring a standard
sufficiently precise to give adequate notice may be seen to have not
so detrimental an impact on this governmental interest. There are two
levels at which conscience is sought to be protected-that of the
physician or other individual health care provider and that of the
institution. An individual physician or other health care provider who
objects could transfer responsibility to another within the same
58institution. Thus, even if a specific standard defined in the statute
would require treatment for some children with disabilities with a
quality of life that is lower than the minimum an individual physician
believes necessary to qualify them ethically for treatment, that
individual's conscience would remain as well protected as before
58. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(d) (Vernon 2007) (an attending
physician who continues to object to providing treatment even after the ethics committee has concluded
that it is appropriate may have the patient transferred to the care of another physician within the
institution or elsewhere).
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enactment of the specific standard. The impact of a specific standard
would be at the institutional level.
To the extent that the state action element of the Fourteenth
Amendment means the hospitals actually affected by the
constitutional requirements of due process are state and other public
hospitals, it is counterintuitive to suggest that governmental hospitals
have a conscience distinct from that of the government itself;
consequently, whatever specific standard might be enacted by the
legislature would itself constitute the ethical standard of those
hospitals. Therefore, requiring a standard specific enough to give
adequate notice would not impinge on the government's interest in
promoting freedom of conscience.
In short, after examining the competing interests, a strong case can
be made that the a standard no more specific than whether treatment
is "inappropriate" is unconstitutionally vague and would violate the
constitutional requirements of procedural due process.
B. Is the Ethics Committee a Neutral Decision Maker?
"[D]ue process requires a 'neutral and detached judge in the first
instance,' and the command is no different when a legislature
delegates adjudicative functions to a private party." 59 "Before one
may be deprived of a protected interest, whether in a criminal or civil
setting, one is entitled as a matter of due process of law to an
adjudicator who is not in a situation 'which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge ... which might lead him
not to hold the balance nice, clear and true . . ,,,60 "That even
purportedly fair adjudicators 'are disqualified by their interest in the
controversy to be decided is, of course, the general rule."''61 Is a
hearing by a hospital ethics committee "a constitutionally adequate
59. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citing
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (citations omitted)).
60. Id. at 617-18 (citing Ward, 409 U.S. at 60).
61. Harndi v. Rurnsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 522).
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factfinding before a neutral decisionmaker"? 62 Of course, ethics
committees are constituted and appointed by the hospitals they serve.
There is no provision to assure neutrality or independence. Many if
not all the members of an ethics committee will generally be
members of the hospital staff.
In Schweiker v. McLure, the Court held that there was no basis to
question the impartiality of hearing officers selected by private
insurance companies to adjudicate Medicare claims because their
salaries and any payments they directed would come from the federal
government, so neither the insurance companies nor the hearing
officers selected by them had any inherent conflict of interest. 63 By
contrast, the hospital staff members who typically serve on ethics
committees are part of the institution and themselves intimately
involved in the provision and withholding of treatment on a daily
basis.
A closer parallel is found in Ward v. Monroeville, where the Court
declared unconstitutional a statute allowing village mayors to serve
as judges when violations of village ordinances were alleged, because
any fines levied would go to the village treasury and "the mayor's
executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan
to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court."
64
Similarly, the hospital staff members who serve on ethics committees
are well aware of the cost of treatment and of its impact on the
resources of their institution.
62. Id. at 537.
63. Schweiker v. McLure, 456 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1982).
64. 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 247 (1980), rejected a claim that
an administrator who assessed fines for violation of labor laws was not an impartial decision maker
because the Court held the administrator's role was not that of a judge or adjudicator, but rather "akin to
that of a prosecutor or civil plaintiff." Any person against whom the administrator assessed a fine could
challenge it before an administrative law judge, whom the Court held to be an appropriately impartial
adjudicator. However, it is not contemplated that an ethics committee decision to deny life-sustaining
treatment to a child with a disability will be subject to any form of administrative-let alone judicial-
review.
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C. Does Due Process Demand a Right to Counsel Before the Ethics
Committee?
Whether due process mandates a right to counsel can be divided
into two questions: whether due process demands that counsel
secured by the patient or patient's representative be permitted to
provide representation at the hearing, and whether an indigent patient
has the right to appointed counsel for this purpose.
Concerning the first question, "[o]riginally, in England... parties
in civil cases . . .were entitled to the full assistance of counsel. 65
However, this statement in a 1932 case that a party in a civil case has
a due process right to counsel the party obtains and pays for was
discounted as dicta in 1975,66 and the Court has since held that due
process does not prohibit the exclusion of counsel from an
administrative investigative proceeding.67 Oddly, perhaps, there is
less guidance from the existing precedents on a party's right in a
noncriminal proceeding to have the assistance of counsel whom the
party compensates than there is on the right to have appointed
counsel if one is indigent. Of course, if in a given type of case due
process requires that appointed counsel be provided for the indigent,
a fortiori those parties who can afford to secure counsel for
themselves must be permitted their assistance.
In Lassiter v. Dep 't of Social Services of Durham County, North
Carolina, the Court held that whether appointed counsel is required
by due process in a termination of parental rights proceeding must be
resolved on a case-by-case basis.68 In doing so, the Court began by
65. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30 (1972) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60
(1932)).
66. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 n.15 (1975) ("Reliance seems to us misplaced on the
statement in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), that '[if] in any case, civil or criminal, a state
or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him
... such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process. . . .' Comments in a
criminal case as to the law in a civil case hardly reach the level of constitutional doctrine, if indeed they
are any more than dicta."). The Powell statement was, however, quoted with strong approval nine years
later in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 n.8 (1984) ("Time has not eroded the force of Justice
Sutherland's opinion for the Court .... ).
67. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 335 (1957).
68. 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
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stating that "[t]he pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this
Court's precedents on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is that
such a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may
lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation." 69 It seems evident
that when loss of his or her life is at stake, a party ought to have at
least the same right to counsel as when the issue is loss of physical
liberty.7°
A strong case may therefore be made on procedural due process
grounds that a child with a disability should be entitled to counsel to
argue the case before the ethics committee that he or she should be
permitted the life-sustaining medical treatment, food, or fluids
necessary to prevent the child's death.
D. Is the Procedure at the Ethics Committee Hearing Adequate?
What procedural safeguards exist for the child with a disability in
the actual conduct of the ethics committee hearing? What ability does
an advocate for the life of the child with a disability have to present
witnesses or evidence, such as contrary evidence concerning the
patient's prospects for recovery or the exact nature of his or her
quality of life?
The ability to challenge adverse evidence has been regarded as
central to due process. There "are few subjects, perhaps, upon which
this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in
the expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and
cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal. 71
There are precedents for alternative procedures that do not follow
the format for full criminal or civil trials. Some states provide for
"contested cases" hearing procedures before administrative law
judges. Under the Texas administrative hearing procedure, for
example, the strict rules of evidence are not followed if "necessary to
69. Id. at 25.
70. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
71. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,540 (1986) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,405 (1965)).
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ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible of proof under those rules"
and if the evidence is "of a type on which a reasonably prudent
person commonly relies in the conduct of the person's affairs. 72 Yet
discovery and depositions are allowed.73 A party may subpoena
witnesses if good cause is shown.74 Cross-examination "required for
a full and true disclosure of the facts" is permitted.75 A party may
require the hearing to be transcribed.76
The availability of this sort of administrative procedure is relevant
in evaluating the nature and weight of two of the Eldridge criteria:
"the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards," and the governmental interests at stake.77 The state's
administrative procedure illustrates the feasibility and availability of
substitute procedural safeguards and may undercut concern that the
government's interests, especially in cost control, would be unduly
undermined by requiring procedures similar to those states routinely
afford in other sorts of contested cases.
Without a defined procedure affording a clear ability to respond to
and challenge adverse evidence and witnesses, including the
opportunity to cross-examine, and affording the ability to present
evidence and argument on each issue involved in the case, ethics
committees deny essential elements of due process to children with
disabilities whose lives are at stake.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, while they remain on the
statute books, have been largely unenforced and have encountered
consistent resistance and opposition from within the medical
community, which has generally advocated and employed in their
72. TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.081 (Vernon 2007). The evidence must also not be precluded by
statute. Id.
73. Id. §§2001.091,2001.102.
74. Id. § 2001.089.
75. Id. § 2001.087.
76. Id. § 2001.059.
77. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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stead ethics committees operating under a "best interests" standard.
This alternative, however, raises substantial procedural due process
concerns that would likely render the approach unconstitutional as it
is typically practiced if state action were present. Even when the
death of a child with a disability is attributable to denial of treatment
at a private, rather than a governmental facility, the absence of basic
due process protections in the ethics committee process offends
tenets of fundamental fairness essential to societal norms of justice.
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